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1. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the role that cost-offsets and incentives for developers play 
in making inclusionary housing programs feasible in different community contexts. 
Municipalities that are developing ordinances may find this analysis of cost-offsets useful 
to decide on the menu of cost-offsets they will provide in an inclusionary ordinance.  
Inclusionary housing programs stimulate creation of affordable housing units 
through local zoning codes, without large subsidies from governments. Under 
inclusionary zoning, local governments request or mandate developers to build a portion 
of affordable housing in new residential developments.1 There are at least an estimated 
200 inclusionary housing programs in localities nationwide, and several more 
municipalities are considering adopting inclusionary ordinances.  
In an era of decreasing federal subsidies for affordable housing and increasing 
financial burdens on governments at the local and state levels, implementation of an 
inclusionary housing policy seems promising. However, if the government does not 
directly subsidize the building of these affordable housing units, then who pays for it? 
What kinds of cost-offsets do local governments grant developers under inclusionary 
ordinances? When local governments grant developer cost offsets to stimulate the 
creation of affordable housing, what is the cost and benefit of these incentives? 
Inclusionary Zoning ordinances typically provide developers with a menu of cost-
offsets to facilitate the development of affordable housing under the ordinance. The cost-
offsets either directly or indirectly provide some kind of financial compensation to the 
developer in exchange for building affordable housing units.  Direct cost-offsets include 
                                                 
1
 Inclusionary housing programs vary on factors such as on whether they are voluntary, conditional or 
mandatory; the income groups targeted; and the terms of affordability. For further information on the 
typology of inclusionary housing programs see Calavita and Grimes (1998).  
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direct financial compensation from the local government to the developer, or waiver of 
fees for inclusionary developments. Indirect cost-offsets provide developers with 
additional flexibility that can help reduce the overall costs of development, such as 
allowing mixed-use zoning where it otherwise would not be allowed through local zoning 
code, or allowing developers to build inclusionary units off-site. Indirect cost-offsets may 
also reduce the standards for developers building under inclusionary ordinances. For 
example, developers may be exempted from parking standards or screening and lot size 
requirements. Other very common indirect cost-offsets include common tools such as the 
density bonus, fast-track permitting for inclusionary projects, and allowing developers to 
pay a fee-in-lieu of constructing inclusionary units.  
 This study begins with a detailed literature review in Chapter Two that examines 
both the specific issue of cost-offsets, as well as the use and necessity for cost-offsets 
within the broader economic and legal arguments about inclusionary zoning. Chapter 
Three of this study explains the relevance of the research and the research methodology. 
 A summary of the cost-offsets used in the sample of 20 ordinances is the topic of 
Chapter Four. I examine the types of incentives and the use of incentives or cost-offsets 
in 20 inclusionary programs across the country. Following in Chapter 5 is an analysis of 
the relationship between contextual factors such as population density and vacancy rates, 
and the use of cost-offsets. Key findings presented in Chapter Six answer the question, 
"under what circumstances are different incentives used?" An examination of the cross-
tabulation of data in Chapter Five is supplemented with interview data. This research 
draws conclusions regarding which types of communities use certain incentives.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This chapter reviews the literature regarding key aspects of the financial, 
economic and legal effects of inclusionary ordinances. An examination of the literature 
regarding economic incidence – who pays – for inclusionary housing, including a 
discussion of how the financial impact of inclusionary zoning are related to the legal 
aspects of inclusionary zoning is first. An examination of the role of cost-offsets or 
incentives, which are important aspects to maintaining the legality of inclusionary 
regulations follows. This discussion of cost-offsets includes a review of the literature on 
the use and effectiveness of cost-offsets. Third, this review looks at academic arguments 
regarding the effects of inclusionary zoning regulation on housing markets. This section 
concludes with a review of the literature on the relationship between inclusionary 
ordinances and community context.  
I use the definition of inclusionary housing originating from Mallach (1984) and 
expanded by Brunick (2006) which states: "inclusionary housing — which encompasses 
inclusionary zoning — is defined as any program that produces affordable housing by 
requiring or encouraging private developers to make a fixed percentage of their housing 
affordable to low- or moderate-income households." Brunick explains that programs vary 
depending on whether they are mandatory or voluntary. In his definition, Brunick also 
explains the broad use of "cost offsets" that include density bonuses, expedited permitting 
processes, or fee waivers that help developers meet the cost of producing affordable 
homes. Brunick considers the ability to provide land or money 'in lieu of' building 
affordable homes within the development, as a form of cost offset.  
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The Economic Incidence: Who Pays? 
This section looks at the classic economic arguments regarding who pays for 
inclusionary zoning, and the economic and legal rationale for providing inclusionary 
zoning as a response to exclusionary zoning. 
Inclusionary housing programs use inclusionary zoning ordinances to request or 
mandate that developers build some portion of affordable housing units within new 
developments. The government typically provides no direct financial assistance to 
developers, although governments often provide non-monetary cost offsets.  
If the government does not subsidize the cost of these new affordable housing 
units, then who does pay the cost of this resource? The classic economic argument is as 
follows:  
The requirement of subsidized housing has the same effect as a development tax. Suppose that a 
developer builds five inclusionary units and loses $10,000 per unit generating a total loss of 
$50,000. If the developer is allowed to build 50 houses for the open market, the effective tax per 
market dwelling is $1000 ($50,000 divided by 50). The developer makes zero economic profit 
(normal accounting profit) with or without inclusionary zoning, so the implicit tax is passed on to 
consumers (housing prices increase) and landowners (the price of vacant land decreases). In other 
words, housing consumers and landowners pay for inclusionary zoning. (O'Sullivan, 2003, p 240)  
 
Because the developer earns zero economic profit and normal accounting profits, the cost 
of building inclusionary housing is borne both by the original landowners and sometimes 
by the new homeowners. In this way, inclusionary zoning policies have a similar 
economic incidence effect as a development tax or impact fee.  
However, there are other contextual factors that classic economic arguments do 
not take into account. In the real world, the unpredictability of the development process 
influences the ability of developers to pass costs forward or backward. Mallach (1984) 
explains that developers price a product based on production costs, the length of time the 
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developer is willing to remain involved with the development, and the price the market 
allows. The classic economic argument explained above does not fully take into account 
variability of time and costs in the development process. In a more complete model, the 
economic incidence is distributed between multiple groups: the landowner, the developer, 
and the buyers of market-rate and inclusionary homes (Mallach, 1984).  
In his discussion of economic incidence, Mallach (1984) emphasizes that "the 
wide diffusion of costs among private and public sector actors" (p 93) makes the analysis 
much more complicated. Who pays for the cost of building a specific inclusionary 
housing development depends on a number of factors, such as whether public subsides or 
cost offsets are included, when inclusionary ordinance was enacted, the housing market, 
and the desirability of the community. Few authors since Mallach's piece have written 
extensively on the topic of the economic incidence of inclusionary zoning. Recent studies 
(Powell and Stringham, 2004) apply the simplified economic view presented above in the 
classic economic argument, and do not address the important caveats presented by 
Mallach.  
It is acknowledged that inclusionary zoning originated in part as a housing policy 
to offset the exclusionary effect that other kinds of zoning have on lower-income families 
(Mallach, 1984; Davidoff, 1985). Planning tools such as large-lot zoning, impact fees, 
and design standards can increase the cost of housing construction, thereby increasing the 
cost of housing.  The length of the regulatory and entitlement process can also impact the 
cost of development and may raise housing prices (Luger and Temkin, 2000). Because 
developers pass some of these costs forward to homebuyers, planning tools that increase 
the cost of housing can become exclusionary.  
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Sometimes local governments intentionally exclude low-income residents, using 
zoning for fiscally motivated purposes. For example, municipalities can use zoning to 
prohibit land uses and therefore exclude residents that would be a net fiscal burden on 
local government, such as households living in high-density housing, or low-income 
households that require more services. Fischel (2003) explains, "Modern planning 
documents hide such intentions in more acceptable language. Expressions of the need to 
preserve farmland, wetlands, open space and historic sites in areas that might otherwise 
be developed are usually all that are necessary to preserve the ordinance from attack as 
fiscally motivated 'exclusionary' zoning" (p. 481).  Standard growth controls can hide the 
underlying intentions of local governments to exclude low-income residents. Further, it is 
difficult to draw a cause and effect relationship between rising housing costs and fiscally 
motivated exclusionary zoning policies.  The fact that the exclusionary intent or 
outcomes of regulations is hidden makes it more difficult for proponents of inclusionary 
zoning to make their case. 
Inclusionary zoning is intended to offset the exclusionary outcomes of other types 
of regulation. O'Sullivan (2003) explains, "By providing subsidized dwellings for low 
income residents, the community partly offsets the exclusionary effects of fiscal zoning" 
(p. 239). Therefore, local governments may implement inclusionary zoning if a 
community decides on – or the state mandates – a reversal of the socially unjust and 
inequitable effects of fiscal and exclusionary zoning.  
Inclusionary zoning is a regulation that may limit the value a property owner 
would otherwise gain from the land. This raises the question of whether inclusionary 
zoning is a regulatory taking. Owens (2001) defines a regulatory taking: 
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When a regulation so significantly affects the use of private property that it has the same effect as 
government seizure of the property. It is unconstitutional unless compensation is paid to the 
owner. A regulation is generally only deemed a taking if it renders the property totally valueless, it 
authorizes a physical invasion of the property or the property is left with no practical use that has 
reasonable economic value. A reduction of property value as a result of a land use regulation is not 
a taking in and of itself (p 166). 
While inclusionary zoning reduces the market value of property, it does not render a 
property totally valueless. In addition, cost-offsets can provide additional value to 
developer to offset the fiscal impact of building the inclusionary units. 
Fischel (2003) explains how regulation such as inclusionary zoning, might be 
legally challenged as a regulatory takings "only when the landowner can claim that there 
is no economically viable use under the new law, a condition easily avoided by most 
governments" (Fischel, 2003 p 482). Local governments can avoid the legal takings 
challenge to inclusionary ordinances by providing incentives to offset the cost of building 
affordable housing. By providing incentives and cost-offsets, an inclusionary ordinance 
has the potential to have a neutral effect on developers’ profit.  
Inclusionary zoning ordinances must address both statutory legal challenges, as 
well as constitutional challenges. The statutory limitations vary by state.2 In addition to 
consideration of takings, discussed above, the constitutional limitations to inclusionary 
zoning include considerations of due process and equal protection (Brown-Graham, 
2004). Due process includes both procedural and substantive considerations. In regards to 
procedural due process challenges, Brown Graham (2004) explains that ordinances 
should contain "procedures set out in the ordinance [that] are adequate to protect the 
interests of those affected" (p 59). In regards to substantive due process challenges "local 
                                                 
2
 The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1919) permits individual states to grant zoning control to 
localities through the general statute. The legality of locally-initiated inclusionary ordinances varies 
depending on the powers granted by each state to its localities. For example, North Carolina is a modified 
Dillon rule state, where local power to implement specific regulations must usually be granted by the state 
legislature. Therefore, localities in North Carolina that are implementing local inclusionary zoning 
ordinances must exercise more caution to ensure legal defensibility than localities in home-rule states.  
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governments must show that the zoning ordinance has a legitimate objective and that 
there is a rational relationship between the means it utilizes and the end it purports to 
achieve" (Brown-Graham, 2004, p 60). In addition, ordinances may be challenged under 
substantive due process challenge if they are arbitrary or discriminatory, such as "if 
similarly situate persons engaged in the same business are subjected to different 
restrictions or entitled to different privileges" (Brown-Graham, 2004, p 60).  
Inclusionary ordinances may also face challenges under Equal Protection claims 
due to the fact that similarly situated groups may be treated differently under an 
inclusionary ordinance. The requirements of inclusionary ordinances vary based on 
location or size of development. For example, inclusionary ordinances often do not apply 
in all districts, and also often exempt projects of certain sizes.  An ordinance will stand up 
against challenges under the Equal Protection clause if there is "a rational justification for 
the difference in treatment" (Brown-Graham, 2004, p 62).  
The Homebuilders of Northern California v. City of Napa case confirms the 
viability of inclusionary housing ordinances against claims of takings and due process 
(Curtain Jr., D. et al., 2002). Recommendations for enhancing the legal defensibility of 
ordinances include providing "benefits to the developer such as density bonuses, 
expedited processing, fee deferrals, and loans or grants…and by including an 
administrative relief provision" (Curtain Jr., D. et al., 2002). The literature shows that 
cost-offsets strengthen the legal defensibility of inclusionary zoning programs against 
constitutional challenges.  
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Cost-offsets to Developers 
Incentives or cost-offsets are defined as local government measures to reduce 
production costs of affordable housing. The inclusionary code in Madison, Wisconsin 
clearly spells out the intention of cost-offsets in that community. The total amount of 
revenue offsets are “equal in value to the difference between the revenues generated by a 
development without any inclusionary zoning units and those generated by a 
development that provides inclusionary dwelling units” (City of Madison, WI, 7/13/06). 
To describe the process of deciding on cost-offsets, Porter (2004) explains, 
"Computing a feasible and fair bonus is more of an art than a science, since so many 
variables enter into the formula, but workable bonuses must rest on a rational foundation" 
(p 227).  There are difficulties in calculating a workable bonus and there are theoretical 
disagreements in the usefulness of such bonuses to developers. 
Cities across the country use cost-offsets to promote affordable housing. For 
example, Tallahassee, Florida provides aggressive cost-offsets to promote affordable 
housing, including deviations for most development standards except environmental 
criteria. These deviations include, setbacks, density bonuses, alternate types of buildings 
not otherwise permitted, and full waiver of development fees for small projects (Goodno, 
2002).  
Cost offsets to make it more feasible to build affordable housing. Brown (2001) 
explains: 
These incentives work, essentially, as trade-offs between a local government and a developer. A 
developer sells or rents a percentage of units in a new development at prices that low to moderate 
income families can afford, and, in return is usually given a 'density bonus' which gives 
permission to build more units than local zoning regulations typically allow. Additional units are 
created because of the increased density (units per acre), and not through the purchase of 
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additional land. This 'free land' acts as a subsidy, since land costs are not included in the rent or 
sales prices of affordable units (p 2).  
Brown considers a density bonus to be "free land" that is given to a developer as a 
tradeoff for building affordable housing. An additional way to deter undue financial 
hardship on developers of small lots is to provide the fee-in-lieu option for developers to 
buy out of the inclusionary program. Brown shows that the fee-in-lieu option can be a 
cost offset since it provides greater flexibility to developers. 
Cost-offsets have different purposes depending on whether the inclusionary 
housing program is voluntary or mandatory. In voluntary programs, density bonuses are 
an incentive for developers to build homes for low-income households, while in 
mandatory programs, density bonuses are intended to compensate developers for 
diminished profits or for losses incurred in providing below-market-rate units. In this way 
cost-offsets enhance the political acceptability of the program and avoid any legal takings 
challenges (Bauman, Kahn, and Williams, 1983). 
When developers receive incentives to offset the cost of producing affordable 
housing, the incentives or cost-offsets function like a subsidy. The imposition of cost-
offsets complicates the classic economic argument. For instance, it is not clear who 
benefits from this subsidy and who bears the burden of this subsidy. 
Who benefits from cost offsets? The benefit of a development cost-offset may 
sometimes be passed back to the original landowner.  Bauman, Kahn, and Williams 
(1983) explain that density bonuses may not be useful cost-offsets to inclusionary 
housing developers because bonuses may simply inflate the cost of land. If the landowner 
knows that the developer is already getting a bonus, the landowner can raise the cost of 
the land. The bonus is effectively passed back to the landowner, rather than recouped by 
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the developer to offset the cost of providing affordable housing. Unlike density bonuses, 
other cost-offsets like fast track permitting – which reduce the cost of construction and 
potentially sale price – are less visible and quantifiable cost-offsets. For that reason the 
landowner may not be able to take these benefits into account when selling the land. In 
that case, the developer and future homebuyer share the benefit of the cost-offset.  
Who bears the burden of incentives and cost offsets? The burden of cost-offsets 
takes a monetary form of reduced municipal revenue or a non-monetary form as negative 
externalities that are borne by local residents (Mallach, 1984). These negative 
externalities can sometimes reduce the effectiveness of a cost-offset. For example, 
density bonuses may not be sufficient as cost-offsets when higher densities limit the 
marketability of a project, necessitates a more expensive type of construction, or becomes 
more controversial in a community (Rosen, 2003). In these circumstance developers are 
not able take advantage of the bonus. Bauman, Kahn and Williams (1983) suggest using 
other economic incentives such as fast track permitting, relaxation of development and 
building standards (floor area, room size, lot size, setback lines, building heights, open 
space, parking spaces and various amenities), and land acquisition assistance. In addition, 
they suggest that financing for affordable housing (such as bond sales) could be used for 
low interest construction loans to developers. 
When the density bonus becomes a non-monetary cost that is too high for 
residents to bear, it can have a detrimental effect on affordable housing overall. For 
example, Brown-Graham (2004) explains that density bonus incentives used in Loudoun 
County, Virginia were recently terminated due to changing local preferences against 
dense development. In this case, residents thought the density bonuses added to excessive 
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housing growth. Changing attitudes in the county regarding tolerance for development 
had a negative impact on the underlying goal of providing affordable housing. The 
Loudoun County case demonstrates how density bonuses can compound NIMBY 
concerns about growth.  
Even incentives like fee waivers have cost impacts that are borne by local resident 
or by other developers (Mallach, 1984, p 91). For example, if a fee for open space 
dedication is waived in an inclusionary development, then the cost of providing that open 
space is forced onto other developers of market rate housing. Alternatively, if the open 
space is not provided, the citizens bear this burden in the form of reduced level of 
municipal services.  
The discussion above illustrates the balancing act that local governments must 
undergo when deciding on cost-offsets. Local governments must balance the cost and 
benefits of cost-offsets in order to maintain an effective inclusionary housing ordinance:  
The cost-offset approach anticipates and to some extent accommodates political opposition, by 
neutralizing or reducing the additional costs developers incur in providing affordable units. This 
approach demonstrates that local governments can be responsive to claims made by the 
development community that they are overregulated, and yet at the same time create a mandate for 
the supply of affordable housing. But, in return for regulatory relief that significantly reduces the 
costs of development, localities should not shirk their responsibility to impose lasting affordability 
standards that more closely reflect housing needs, particularly those of very-low-income 
households" (Calavita and Grimes, 1998 p15).  
Here Calavita and Grimes acknowledge the importance of working with developers to 
identify useful cost offsets, but remind planners that they must balance the use of cost-
offsets with the goals of sustainably providing affordable housing to those groups that 
most need it. Although developers argue that cost-offsets do not cover the full cost of 
providing affordable housing, local governments must understand that there are limits to 
the amount of cost-offsets they should reasonably provide to developers. 
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Studies show that the affordability gap between what people can afford and what 
it costs to build housing can be lessened through cost-offsets, however the development 
industry does not agree that these measures are sufficient cost-offsets (Brown and 
Harrington, 1991; Johnson et al. 1990; Rivinius 1991). In the context of California, 
Calavita and Grimes (1998) note that in addition to the California state mandated Density 
Bonus Law, additional regulatory relief is provided by 39 percent of localities, and 
financial cost-offsets in 51 percent. To address developers’ concerns about the 
sufficiency of cost-offsets, many localities increase the types of regulatory relief and 
cost-offsets offered.  
Local governments find that cost offsets and incentives are essential tools for 
promoting development of affordable housing units through inclusionary zoning. Brunick 
(2003) writes:  
While they may not be required, strong policy, political and legal reasons exist for including real 
and substantial 'cost offsets' or incentives for developers in any inclusionary program. As a matter 
of policy, such incentives ensure that the entire community shares the burden of producing 
affordable housing equally. Politically the presence of cost offsets can help to win broader support 
for an inclusionary housing program. Legally, the inclusion of cost offsets can help to ensure that 
an inclusionary program will not be judged unconstitutional (p 26).  
There are economic, political, and legal reasons to offer cost offsets or incentives. 
However, local governments who offer developers cost offsets or incentives in 
inclusionary housing programs need to understand the trade-offs regarding the economic 
incidence and effectiveness of this tool. 
 Porter (2004) notes the importance of choosing incentives that "make sense (i.e. 
cents) in the marketplace" (p 36). In his example, the density bonus may not be useful for 
developers with projects in neighborhoods with influential opponents of density 
increases. There are a range of cost-offsets and incentive that localities may choose. It is 
important for an ordinance to provide cost-offsets that are appropriate for a particular 
Development Incentives and Cost-offsets in Inclusionary Housing Programs     Emily J. Price 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Page 14 
housing market. Successful ordinances will provide cost-offsets that address specific 
needs of local developers. 
The Economic Effects on the Housing Market 
This section reviews the economic effects that inclusionary housing programs 
have on the local housing market. Based on the literature, I examine how the desirability 
of a housing market affects the provision of inclusionary housing and how an increase in 
inclusionary housing units affects the local housing market.  
 Economists argue that the ability of a developer to pass on the costs associated 
with an inclusionary housing program vary "depending on the community and its place in 
the regional housing market" (Ellickson, 1981; Mallach, 1984). According to these 
economists, in housing markets with no unique attributes, for which there are perfect 
substitutes available, developers are unable to pass on "non-standard costs" to buyers of 
market rate housing. Therefore, developers must instead pass the costs backwards to 
landowners. In desirable markets for which there are no substitutes, buyers will pay a 
premium price to live in a community, and developers pass forward some of the costs of 
developing affordable housing to the consumers of market rate housing. Mallach (1984, p 
89) cautions that even a highly desirable housing market will "not support infinite 
premium pricing." There are limits to what the market will bear.  
The premium that homebuyers are willing to pay to live in "desirable" housing 
markets means that the costs of inclusionary housing programs are more easily absorbed 
in these markets. It follows that inclusionary housing programs are more commonly 
implemented in desirable markets such as San Francisco, California, Orange County, 
California, and recently in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Mallach (1984) explains the 
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"poetic justice" inherent in the fact that desirable housing markets tend to be the least 
affordable. However, Mallach (1984) points to two serious problems. First, these 
desirable communities tend to be geographically small. It follows that an inclusionary 
program in a desirable community has a limited impact on the nation's affordability 
problem as a whole. Smith, Delaney and Liou (1996), note that in Congressional 
Testimony in 1990 Economist William Fischel suggested that even under the best 
circumstances, inclusionary housing can provide only about 10 percent of a community's 
housing needs.  
There is a possibility that the imposition of a proportion of inclusionary housing 
units could have a negative impact on the property values and desirability of the 
community. However, Mallach (1984) counters that "substantially more variation in 
income within developments, even relatively small-scale developments, may be more 
tolerable than is sometimes believed" (p 100). Much of the impact of affordable 
inclusionary units depends on their design, their phasing relative to more expensive units 
in the development, and the management of affordable inclusionary units.  
There is much debate in the literature regarding the economic impacts of 
inclusionary housing units on the local housing market. Much of this academic debate 
revolves around Ellickson's 1981 article on the "The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning," in 
which he claims that inclusionary zoning can ironically increase the cost of housing for 
all households, including moderate- and low-income households.  
Ellickson (1981) argues that inclusionary programs are essentially taxes on the 
production of new housing and "will usually increase general housing prices, a result 
which further limits the housing opportunities of moderate-income families. In short, 
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despite the assertions of inclusionary zoning proponents, most inclusionary ordinances 
are just another form of exclusionary practice" (p 1170). Ellickson bases much of his 
argument against inclusionary zoning on the filtering model of housing markets. 
There are several reasons to be critical of his analysis. First, he relies on the 
filtering model for housing markets without accounting for the flaws in this model. 
Second, he incorrectly refers to inclusionary housing as a subsidy for affordable housing. 
Third, he does not consider the ameliorating effect of cost-offsets that can make it cost-
effective for developers to produce inclusionary housing.  
Basing his analysis on the filtering model of housing markets, Ellickson argues 
that the production of luxury housing will increase the supply of total housing more 
efficiently than the inclusionary housing model. Dietderich (1996) explains a technical 
flaw in this line of reasoning: 
Ellickson defines the 'supply' of housing solely according to its market value. He pays no attention 
to how inclusionary zoning rules change the number and type of units built…For example imagine 
that a luxury house sells for $100,000, and an affordable house for $60,000. At these prices, an 
inclusionary rule that causes three affordable houses to be built instead of two luxury homes 
actually reduces the 'supply' of housing (p 44).  
Ellickson incorrectly equates the value of a home with the quantity of housing units 
produced. Therefore, he ignores the lack of substitutability between housing types. 
Ellickson's reliance on the filtering model is flawed for other reasons as well. He does not 
take into account important regional factors such as immigration and demographic 
changes. He also ignores segmentation within a housing market, such as barriers that 
limit consumers' ability to "filter up".  
Ellickson makes a second major flaw in his article. He incorrectly refers to 
inclusionary housing as a subsidy. While some combination of landowner, developer and 
homebuyer pay for – or "subsidize" – the provision of inclusionary housing, it is not a 
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typical government subsidy for affordable housing. It is instead a planning tool designed 
to induce the private sector to build affordable housing. Again, Dietderich (1996 ) 
responds that:  
Persons with low to moderate incomes, who live at higher density, can often out-bid the wealthy 
for suburban land. Although such competition is illegal under most exclusionary zoning rules, it 
makes little sense to normalize the noncompetitive baseline, and call any move toward 
competition among income classes a 'subsidy' (p 41). 
 
Dietderich counters Ellickson's terminology by pointing out that inclusionary zoning 
exists within the greater context of a number of growth controls. Some – such as large-lot 
zoning – are now described as exclusionary. Dietderich questions why Ellickson views 
inclusionary zoning as a subsidy to low-income households, but does not view large lot 
zoning as a subsidy to wealthy households. 
Finally, Ellickson only briefly notes that cost-offsets can make it more cost 
effective for developers to produce inclusionary housing. Ellickson does not include cost-
offsets – a major component of most current inclusionary programs – in his analysis. For 
this reason, several authors have pointed out that this line of reasoning is not applicable to 
the majority of inclusionary housing programs (Merriam, 1985; Dietderich, 1996; Basolo 
and Calavita, 2004).   
While there is still an active debate regarding the economic effects of inclusionary 
programs, Porter (2004a) suggests, "The proof that inclusionary programs can make 
economic sense for developers is that existing programs have not shut down housing 
development and that developers continue to plan and construct projects that include 
affordable housing within affordable and mixed-income projects" (p 220).  
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Inclusionary Housing: Macro-Structural Factors and Community Context 
Porter (2004b) organizes his presentation of case studies of inclusionary housing 
ordinances into categories based on community context. The categories used are:  
• standard programs in growing communities 
• mandatory programs in suburbs short on developable land 
• voluntary programs 
• big-city programs 
The author chooses this structure to "facilitate comparisons among similar approaches." 
Porter recognizes that while inclusionary programs share general similarities, the details 
of each program – such as choice of cost-offsets – depend in large part on community 
context.  
Calavita and Grimes (1998) explain that inclusionary programs in Northern 
California were stricter due to the lack of involvement by developers in the process and 
lack of political force of developers in those communities. However, in this discussion 
the authors do not explain whether the cost-offsets offered to developers were also 
weaker in communities where developers had less political power.  
Regarding incentives and cost offsets, Calavita and Grimes (1998) explain that 
changing political and market circumstances in California led to the cost offset approach. 
In the early 1990s a recession increased the power of the development industry as 
overregulation was blamed for high housing costs.  
Under these political circumstances, the strategic choice for local governments was to develop 
inclusionary programs that were more palatable to the building industry. This could be achieved 
by making cost offsets a central feature of IH programs. Cost offsets provide developers with 
financial assistance and regulatory relief as a way to counter the costs of providing inclusionary 
units. Regulatory relief might include density increases, fast track permit approval, impact fee 
waivers or deferral, lower parking requirements, and such relaxation of design restrictions as 
reduced street widths and setbacks (p9). 
The use of cost offsets and incentives is now standard in inclusionary ordinances.  
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In his study on non-compliance and the California Housing Element Law, Lewis 
(2003) analyzes characteristics of communities that do not comply with the states "fair 
share" doctrine. The characteristics that emerge in localities that do not comply with the 
law are (1) community social status and exclusion; (2) land use characteristics, land costs, 
and lack of vacant land; (3) local government resources; and (4) local politics and 
residential growth policies. Lewis' analysis sheds light on potential barriers to 
participation in inclusionary housing programs, barriers that incentives and cost offsets 
may alleviate. 
Summary 
This chapter reviewed the fiscal, economic and legal issues regarding inclusionary 
zoning programs in order to place the study of cost offsets in a broader context. A 
discussion of the literature of cost offsets and incentives was followed by a review of the 
literature on housing markets and inclusionary zoning programs. This chapter concluded 
with an overview of the literature that looks at the relationship between community 
context and the use of inclusionary zoning. The following chapters advance the literature 
on cost-offsets for inclusionary zoning forward through an in-depth examination of cost-
offsets in twenty U.S. cities.
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3. METHODOLOGY 
Research Question and Relevance 
This study explores the role that cost offsets play in making local inclusionary 
housing programs feasible to developers. The following principal research questions will 
be asked:   
1. How do different types of local government-granted cost-offsets facilitate 
private sector development of affordable housing through local inclusionary 
housing programs? 
2. What kinds of cost-offsets to different localities use, and what is the frequency 
of the use? 
3. Do variations in community context explain differences in development cost-
offsets for affordable housing across localities?  
a. Do development cost-offsets depend on the stringency of the ordinance 
and what is required of the developer? 
b. Do development cost-offsets differ for inclusionary housing programs 
based on regional context? 
c. Does the choice of cost-offsets depend on the social, economic and 
political context of the locality?  
 
This study provides information that may be valuable to housing developers and to 
localities concerned with creating effective inclusionary housing programs.  
 This study sheds light on the different types of cost-offsets that local 
governments provide to developers in order to facilitate the production of affordable 
housing through local government code. It also characterizes why certain cost-offsets are 
used more frequently in certain localities than other places. This study goes beyond the 
existing literature by determining why certain cost-offsets are chosen and how that 
depends on contextual factors, such as population density or homeownership rates.  
 The findings from this study will provide information that is useful to local 
governments that are considering implementing inclusionary housing programs. This 
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review of cost-offsets will be particularly useful to localities in states with no mandate for 
affordable housing. In states which lack a mandate for affordable housing such as North 
Carolina, incentives and cost-offsets are essential tools to facilitate the production of 
affordable housing through local government regulation that is legally, politically and 
economically effective. 
Data and Methodology 
The unit of analysis in this study is the development cost-offset(s) within each 
inclusionary housing program. The research uses a mixed-method approach, employing 
both qualitative data collection and interview research strategies. First, a representative 
sample of 20 ordinances was selected. Then, data on the use of cost-offsets within a 
sample of 20 ordinances was coded. Finally, cross tabulations provided the basis for 
analysis of the data, and interviews supplemented the key findings. 
The goal for selecting the sample of 20 ordinances was to get a sample that 
contained strong regional and demographic variation. To do this, I first created a list of 
all available inclusionary programs, then selected a geographically representative mix of 
ordinances, and finally used population and relative location to narrow down the original 
list of 200 ordinances to 20 ordinances. I ensured that the sample was representative of 
six geographic regions of the country: Northeast, South, Midwest, Mid-Atlantic, Rocky 
Mountains and West Coast. Within each region a sample was of places with small, 
medium and large populations was selected to provide variation in city size.  
The first step in the selection process was to create a master list of all known 
inclusionary ordinances nationwide (see Appendix A).  This list began with a shorter 
listing from David Rusk's website detailing 108 California programs, and 20 non-
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California programs (Rusk, 2003). California ordinances are heavily overrepresented 
both in the literature and in number. To comply with my goal of having regional variation 
of ordinances, I supplemented the list of non-California programs by looking through the 
appendices of reports, publications, and books with case studies of inclusionary zoning 
programs. Searching the Knowledgeplex.org website, a clearinghouse of housing and 
community development articles and reports, provided several leads as it contained 
references to local news articles about development of inclusionary ordinances over the 
last several years. This added 21 additional non-California programs. In addition, by 
searching municipal websites outside of California, I was able to locate additional 
municipalities with inclusionary ordinances posted on the Internet. Using the google.com 
search engine, I searched for the word "Inclusionary" within all sites ending in ".us", 
excluding sites ending in "ca.us" [Inclusionary Ordinance -site:ca.us site:.us]. This search 
process resulted in the addition of approximately twenty ordinances to the list. The search 
process also ensured that most of the existing inclusionary ordinances in municipalities 
with internet addresses ending in “[state].us” were considered in this selection.  
The second stage involved selecting a sample of inclusionary zoning programs 
from the master list through geographical cluster sampling, treating several respondents 
within a local area as a cluster. To do this, I first divided the master list of ordinances into 
the following geographic regions: South, Northeast, Northwest, Mountains, Midwest, 
Mid-Atlantic, and California. Within each of the above regions I selected a 25 percent 
sample (between 2 and 5 inclusionary ordinances) representing municipalities with a 
range of population within each region. I attempted to select an ordinance from one large 
city, from one smaller city, and where applicable from rural or suburban areas.  
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The resulting list was a cluster sampling of 22 ordinances nationwide. Two 
ordinances were eliminated because, after review, they did not fit the definition of 
inclusionary zoning ordinance for the purposes of this study. One was Stamford, 
Connecticut's Commercial Linkage program, which is a fee-based program only targeting 
commercial development. The second was the program in Sisters, Oregon, which applies 
only to land in annexation districts. Inclusionary Zoning is actually prohibited in Oregon, 
which explains why Sisters uses this alternative method. The restriction on inclusionary 
zoning in Oregon explains the lack of representation in programs from the Northwest.3 
The final group of 20 ordinances is listed in Table 1. The full citations for these 
ordinances are listed in Appendix B. 
Table 1 List of Ordinances 
MUNICIPALITY COUNTY STATE REGION 
Washington District of Colombia District of Colombia DC Mid-Atlantic 
Montgomery County Montgomery County MD Mid-Atlantic 
Princeton Borough and Township Princeton Borough NJ Mid-Atlantic 
New York New York City NY Mid-Atlantic 
Highland Park Lake County IL Mid-West 
Madison Dane County WI Mid-West 
Basalt   Eagle County CO Mountain 
Denver  Denver County CO Mountain 
Blaine County Blaine County ID Mountain 
Boston  Suffolk County MA Northeast 
Quincy Norfolk County MA Northeast 
Burlington  Chittenden County VT Northeast 
Martin County FL Martin County FL South 
Tallahassee  Leon County FL South 
Davidson Davidson County NC South 
Mount Pleasant Charleston County SC South 
Calistoga Napa  CA California 
Pasadena Los Angeles CA California 
Carlsbad  San Diego  CA California 
San Francisco  San Francisco  CA California 
 
                                                 
3
 Seattle, WA is currently studying Inclusionary Zoning as part of its Affordable Housing program. 
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The development cost-offsets in the sample of 20 inclusionary housing programs 
in rural, suburban, and urban areas across the country were analyzed. These cost-offsets 
were coded based on the frequency, level and type of cost-offset provided to developers 
within each ordinance. Chapter Four provides the results of the types of cost-offsets that 
are used within these 20 ordinances.  
In order to draw conclusions regarding the use of cost-offsets and community 
context, I gathered data from the 2000 US Census on population size, population density, 
vacancy rate, poverty rate, race, housing tenure, housing cost burden, and senior 
population. I also recorded whether the inclusionary programs are mandatory, voluntary 
or conditional. Chapter Five summarizes the results of the examination of relationships 
between the contextual variables and the use of cost offsets.  
The final step in this study was to draw conclusions regarding the use of cost-
offsets and community context. Cross tabulations provided insight into relationships 
between use of cost-offsets and community context factors. Interviews with local 
government officials involved in drafting inclusionary zoning ordinances provided 
additional qualitative information. Chapter Six presents the key findings in the analysis 
and discusses trends in terms of use of cost-offset and community context. 
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4. SUMMARY OF COST-OFFSETS IN 20 INCLUSIONARY ZONING 
ORDINANCES 
This section summarizes the results of the study of cost-offsets in 20 inclusionary 
zoning ordinances nationwide. This summary provides an overview of the affordable 
housing requirements in each ordinance and reports on the frequency and usage of each 
type of cost offset.  
Summary of Requirements 
Before completing an analysis of the cost-offsets in each ordinance, it is necessary 
to describe the requirements within each ordinance that the cost-offsets are designed to 
offset. The following section provides a description of the requirements for the provision 
of affordable housing among the selected sample of 20 inclusionary ordinances. These 
are classified in Table 1 according to the strength of the requirements within each 
ordinance.  
The requirements examined for this study are the percentage of affordable 
housing within a development, the threshold project size at which the ordinance applies, 
and whether the ordinance is voluntary, mandatory or conditional. Requirements such as 
income targeting and permanent affordability provisions are not considered because they 
are outside the scope of this study.  
Table 1 provides a typology of requirements among each of the 20 ordinances. 
The level or strength of requirements in each ordinance provides a benchmark from 
which we can compare one ordinance to another.  The grades allow us to ask the 
exploratory question: "do ordinances with higher requirements contain and equally high 
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level degree of cost-offsets?" If the strength of the requirements does not explain the 
choice and degree of cost-offsets, then there must be other contextual factors beyond just 
the ordinance requirements that influence the types of cost-offsets that municipalities 
provide developers within inclusionary ordinances.  
The ordinances in Table 1 are assigned a grade of A, B or C based on the strength 
of requirements within each ordinance. To earn an “A” grade, an ordinance must be 
mandatory and have a very low trigger point of less than 10 units. “B” grade ordinances 
are also mandatory but have trigger points of between 10 and 30 units. “C” grade 
ordinances are either not mandatory, or if mandatory have limited applicability within a 
municipalities zoning district. This ranking system is intended to provide a comparison 
between ordinances. It does not take into account the effect of contextual factors such as 
population and the size and unit density of typical residential developments4. These 
contextual factors are explored further in Chapters Five and Six.  
                                                 
4
 When examined against population size, this grading scale gives “A” grades only to places of population 
under 40,000, with the exception of Pasadena. Montgomery County, MD has a well-known and successful 
ordinance. It earns only a “B” grade because the trigger point of 30 units is relatively high compared with 
the other ordinances in this study. The trigger point is high because much of the development in the county 
is large subdivision development of units around this range.  
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Table 2 Requirements of Selected Inclusionary Ordinances 
MUNICIPALITY GRADE PERCENTAGE 
REQUIRED UNITS 
IZ TRIGGER 
POINT  
(units within 
development) 
MANDATORY 
VOLUNTARY 
CONDITIONAL 
Basalt, CO   A 20% none   M 
Blaine County, ID A 20% none   M 
Burlington, VT  A 15%-25% 5 M 
Calistoga, CA A 20% 5 M 
Carlsbad, CA A 15% 7 M 
Davidson, NC A 12% none  M 
Highland Park, IL A 20% 5 M 
Pasadena, CA A 15% none  M 
Princeton Borough and 
Township, NJ 
A 22% none   M 
Denver, CO  B 10% 30 M 
Madison, WI B 15% 10 M 
Martin County FL B 12% 10 M 
Montgomery County, MD B 12.5% 30 M 
San Francisco , CA B 15% 10 M 
Washington, DC B 8%-10% 10 M 
Boston, MA  C 10% 10 C 
Mount Pleasant, SC C 10% 50 M 
New York, NY C 20% 50 V 
Quincy, MA C 10% 10 C 
Tallahassee, FL  C 10% 50 M 
 
Mandatory, Voluntary, and Conditional 
Inclusionary ordinances can be broadly characterized as mandatory, voluntary, or 
conditional. The designation describes the conditions under which a developer must 
comply with the inclusionary requirement. Among the 20 ordinances studied in this 
research, 17 are mandatory, 1 is voluntary (New York City) and 2 are conditional 
(Boston, Massachusetts and Quincy, Massachusetts).  
All mandatory ordinances have at least one development circumstance under 
which a developer is required to meet inclusionary housing requirements. However, as 
this study demonstrates, mandatory ordinances often contain exemptions for 
developments in specific areas or for projects under a certain size. Voluntary ordinances 
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do not require a developer to produce affordable housing. However, voluntary ordinances 
provide incentives to developers who choose to build inclusionary units. Conditional 
inclusionary zoning is an indirect approach that is "based on the need of developers to 
receive approval from the local government before constructing a large residential 
project" (Brown-Graham, 2004, p 20), such as when seeking a conditional use permit or 
an increase in existing density. Like mandatory and voluntary inclusionary zoning, 
conditional inclusionary zoning also provides cost-offsets to developers who build 
affordable units.  
Mandatory, voluntary, and conditional ordinances are distinct in terms of the 
applicability of each ordinance, but they share common cost offsets. While mandatory 
ordinances have legal enforcement mechanisms, voluntary and conditional ordinances 
rely on incentives and cost offsets to get developers to comply. Therefore, while 
voluntary and conditional ordinances tend to be less successful at producing units, they 
are still are relevant to this research.  
Percentage of affordable units required 
The percentage of affordable units required in each development describes how 
much affordable housing a developer must provide. The percentage of affordable units is 
an indicator of an ordinance’s level of stringency. Ordinances with a relatively high 
requirement for affordable housing are relatively more stringent.  
Most of the ordinances examined require developers build between 10 and 20 
percent affordable units. Out of the 20 ordinances sampled, 6 require that the developer 
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build 10% of the units to be affordable5 as defined within each ordinance, 3 require that 
the developer build 12% of the units to be affordable, 5 require that the developer build 
15% of the units to be affordable, and another 5 require that the developer build 20% of 
the units to be affordable. Requiring the most from developers, Burlington, Vermont's 
ordinance requires that any development built within the waterfront district provide 25% 
affordable units.  
The variation in percentage requirements may partially be explained by the 
existence of political will to require more affordable units from developers. The variation 
may also be explained because in some markets, it may not be financially feasible to 
require developers to build more than 10 percent affordable units.  
Washington, DC provides an alternate measure for determining the percentage of 
inclusionary units, by requiring 75% of its achievable bonus density be provided at 
affordable levels. The Washington, DC ordinance is also unique because the 
requirements in the ordinance vary depending on the costs of developing particular types 
of properties. For example, the percentage required of steel frame construction is less 
(8%) than the percentage required of stick built construction (10%). The ordinance 
provides an even lower affordability requirement for residential development in high-
density mixed use areas to encourage residential development in an area where it is often 
more profitable to development commercial properties than residential properties. The 
Washington, DC planning department recognizes that imposing restrictions such as 
inclusionary requirements on residential development in certain circumstances may 
                                                 
5
 It is important to note that the definition of affordable varies among ordinances. As explained above, the 
income targeting provisions in each ordinance were not considered in this analysis. Therefore, the term 
"affordable" relates to the definition within each ordinance. 
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discourage residential development. The requirements in this ordinance are designed to 
be sensitive to development issues.  
Threshold project size 
The trigger point or threshold for when an inclusionary ordinance applies to a 
development varies by municipality. The threshold chosen usually relates to the type of 
development that is common within each region. In some municipalities all residential 
developments must comply with the inclusionary ordinances, regardless of size. These 
communities tend to be high-growth, non-urban areas where large subdivision 
development is typical and where infill or small-scale development is less common. 
Three municipalities have inclusionary ordinances requiring that all developments 
5 units and greater comply with the Inclusionary Ordinance. Another six municipalities 
require that developments of 10 units or greater comply with the inclusionary housing 
ordinance. Washington, DC is among these ordinances. This number was chosen based 
on the city's 10% requirement for an affordable unit.  At a threshold of 10 units, exactly 
one inclusionary unit is required.  
Five municipalities have relatively high thresholds at 30 units or greater. These 
ordinances have “B” and “C” grades, based on the reasoning that a high threshold means 
that more development is exempt from the inclusionary requirements. However, a closer 
look reveals that these thresholds relate to the fact that large scale development is typical 
in these areas. There is high density, large scale development in New York, and relatively 
lower density, large scale development in places like Montgomery County, Maryland.  
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Other requirements 
Beyond the requirements for percentage of inclusionary units and threshold 
project size described above, seven ordinances contain requirements such as providing 
the same parking options and amenities between inclusionary units and market rate units. 
In addition, 11 ordinances spell out that inclusionary units be "comparable" in quality to 
market rate units.  
Commercial and Industrial linkage requirements are folded into 2 ordinances 
(Basalt, Colorado and Calistoga, California) which require that non-residential 
developments contribute to the inclusionary housing program, usually through fee 
payments. Some cities have commercial linkage fee ordinances that stand alone from the 
inclusionary ordinances. 
Finally, two ordinances (Boston and Montgomery County) provide flexibility by 
basing the actual inclusionary zoning requirements on the determination by a planning 
board or other governing body.  
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Summary of Cost Offsets 
This section describes a typology of cost-offsets that are granted to developers 
through inclusionary zoning ordinances. The intent of this section is to provide a 
summary of the types and frequency of cost-offsets that are used in each ordinance.  
Table 2 categorizes the types of cost-offsets, provides a brief explanation of each, 
and reports on the results of the frequency of usage among the 20 ordinances studied in 
this study. See Appendix C and D for full data tabulation.  
The cost-offsets are categorized based on their common characteristics, falling 
into one of two broad categories: indirect cost offsets or direct cost offsets. Direct cost-
offsets provide quantifiable benefits to developers in the form of money or fee waivers.6  
Indirect cost-offsets provide less direct or quantifiable benefits to developers such as 
expedited processing and density bonuses. Indirect cost-offsets generally provide 
developers with greater flexibility and in some cases allow for a reduction of 
development standards. The majority of cost offsets fall into the “indirect” category. 
Table 2 quantifies the usage of each of the cost-offsets among the 20 ordinances 
examined for this study. 
                                                 
6
 The Carlsbad, CA ordinance provides land as a cost-offset to development of affordable housing. Section 
21.86.050.4d of the municipal code for Carlsbad, CA states: “The city council may, but is not required to, 
provide direct financial incentives, including the provision of publicly owned land, or the waiver of fees or 
dedication requirements.” However, this offset is only available to affordable units built “in addition to” 
inclusionary units. The ordinance specifies that affordable units built under the mandatory inclusionary 
ordinance do not qualify to receive land as a cost-offset. 
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Table 3 Typology and Frequency of Usage of Cost-Offsets 
Type Explanation Number 
of Cities 
Percentage 
of Cities 
DIRECT 
Fee Wavier … are provided by the locality to the developer to 
directly compensate for the requirements of 
building inclusionary units 
7 35% 
Cash … is given by the locality to the developer to 
directly compensate for the requirements of 
building inclusionary units 
3 15% 
INDIRECT 
Density Bonus … allows developers to build more units on a site 
than allowed by right 13 65% 
Fee in Lieu … gives developers the option to pay cash instead 
of building affordable units 16 80% 
Fast-Track Processing … guarantees that permit applications will be 
processed more quickly than normal 5 25% 
Exemptions for Meeting 
Affordable Housing Goals 
… reduces or exempts developers from 
inclusionary requirements if projects meet other 
housing goals such as lower income targeting or 
service provision 
11 55% 
Exempt based on district … exempts certain projects based on location in 
certain zoning districts; exempts certain non-
conforming projects from alterations that do not 
increase the number of units  
7 35% 
Flexibility: 19 95% 
Off-site units (all) … gives developers the flexibility to build 
inclusionary units on a site that is different from 
the market rate site 
16 80% 
Off-site (only in 
extreme7 cases) 
… only allows off-site construction of 
inclusionary units under strict circumstances 6 30% 
Choice of housing type … gives developers flexibility they would 
otherwise not have in choosing the housing type 
(SFR, Townhouse, etc)for inclusionary units 
8 40% 
Approval of Mixed-use 
zoning 
… gives developers the option to build mixed-use 
commercial or office properties on the 
development, to offset the cost of inclusionary 
units 
3 15% 
 
"Other" cost-offsets or 
waivers on a case-by-
case basis 
… provide a catch-all opportunity for developers 
to petition for reductions in inclusionary 
requirements 
10 50% 
Reduction of Standards: 13 65% 
Exemption from 
Parking Requirements 
… gives developers an exemption from parking 
requirements in developments 6 30% 
Exemption from 
Setback, Lot Size or 
Screening Requirement 
… gives developers flexibility they would 
otherwise not have in the site plan for an 
inclusionary development 
7 35% 
 
Allow interior finish of 
Inclusionary units to 
differ from market-rate  
… stipulates developers may provide less costly 
interior amenities in inclusionary units 9 45% 
                                                 
7
 From the definition in Brown-Graham, 2004: "Extreme cases typically are environmental constraint on a 
parcel of land that prevent the inclusion of affordable units or use of density bonus." 
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 From Table 2, the most frequently used cost-offsets are the fee-in-lieu tool and the 
ability to construct off-site units. Both of these cost-offsets occurred in 80% of the 
sample of ordinances. The second most frequently used cost-offset is the density bonus, 
used in 65% of the ordinances. In addition, almost all ordinances provided some 
mechanism for flexibility and 65% of ordinances allowed for a reduction of standards 
such as parking, site or design standards.  
 The least frequently used cost-offsets are the direct payment of cash from a 
municipality to a developer and the ability to build mixed-use developments to offset the 
cost of residential inclusionary units. Both of these tools were used in only 15% of the 
ordinances studied. Fast-track processing was another less-frequently used tool, used in 
only 25% of the ordinances.  
Direct Cost Offsets 
Only 9 of the 20 ordinances studied provide any kind of direct cost-offset. The 
types of direct costs-offsets that a municipality provides a developer are cash and fee-
waivers. 
Fee Wavier 
A relatively common direct cost-offset that municipalities provide to developers is 
a fee wavier. Of the 20 ordinances, 35% have provisions for fee waivers for projects that 
build inclusionary units. One possible explanation for why a municipality would provide 
this benefit is whether or not there are burdensome fees in the first place.  
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Cash 
Just three municipalities provide cash to developers for building inclusionary 
units. These municipalities are Madison, Wisconsin, Denver, Colorado, and Mount 
Pleasant, South Carolina. The Denver ordinance provides a “standard incentive” 
reimbursement rate of between $5,500 to $10,000 per unit depending on level of 
affordability; $250,000 is the maximum amount that is given to each applicant per year. 
The Madison ordinance also provides cash subsidies between $2,500 and $5,000 
depending on affordability of unit. Cash subsidies provide a direct financial benefit to 
developers who must build inclusionary units. Further interviews with the drafters of 
these ordinances would shed light on why these localities chose to include cash subsidies 
in the menu of cost-offsets, and why the particular amounts of subsidy were chosen. 
Indirect Cost Offsets 
Each of the 20 ordinances provide for some form of indirect cost-offset. These 
indirect cost-offsets range from providing developers with density bonuses, to offering 
increased flexibility for inclusionary development. Table 3 lists the frequency of use of 
each of the broadly categorized cost-offsets. The most frequently-used cost offsets are the 
fee-in-lieu provision and the ability to construct off-site units. Following is an in-depth 
analysis of the frequency in which municipalities implement each of the indirect cost-
offsets.  
Density Bonus 
Among the inclusionary ordinances exmined, 65% use the density bonus, and 
35% do not use the density bonus. The density bonus is a tool to offset the cost of 
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building an inclusionary unit by providing developers with the right to build extra units 
than would otherwise be allowed. In two cases (Blaine County, Colorado and Highland 
Park, Illinois) the bonus is actually given on a 1-to1 basis for each inclusionary unit. 
Despite the functionality of the density bonus tool, not all ordinances include the bonus 
as an incentive. 
The cities that do not use the density bonus specifically as a cost-offset for the 
inclusionary housing are: Princeton, New Jersey; Basalt, Colorado; Davidson, North 
Carolina; Calistoga, California; Martin County, Florida;  Boston, Massachusetts; and 
Quincy, Massachusetts.8 One documented reason why municipalities may not apply the 
density bonus is when they face political opposition to increase density further, such as in 
the case of Loudoun County, Virginia (Brown-Graham, 2004). Some places are also 
unwilling to build more densely than their code allows. Other places, like Davidson, 
North Carolina, take a firm stand that the municipality will not “give” anything to 
developers.9  
The 13 ordinances in this sample that use the density bonus measure and apply the 
bonus in a variety of ways. Seven ordinances base the percentage of density bonus 
allowed on the number of inclusionary units provided in the development, with the 
density bonus ranging from 15% to 25% of total development. In a few cases the 
measurement is more complicated than a one-to-one ratio, and does not increase in a 
linear way. In Burlington, Vermont, the allowable bonus density increases if lower 
incomes are targeted within the inclusionary units. In New York City, where space is at a 
                                                 
8
 Some of these municipalities still offer the density bonus through incentive-based affordable housing 
programs that are in addition to the inclusionary ordinance. For the scope of this research, those additional 
incentive-based programs were not included in analysis. 
9
 Presentation given by the Town of Davidson Planning Director at the University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill, November 2006 
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premium, the density bonus is scheduled based on total allowable Floor Area Ratio 
(FAR) rather than on allowable number of units.  The allowable FAR for a development 
increases under the New York City ordinance just as the allowable unit density increases 
under other ordinances. Two ordinances (Washington, DC and Tallahassee, Florida) use a 
flat percentage bonus of 20% for all developments. Finally, three ordinances (Madison, 
Wisconsin, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, and San Francisco, California) determine the 
allowable density bonus on a case-by-case basis during the permitting process.  
Fee in Lieu 
Among the inclusionary ordinances studied, 80% use the fee-in-lieu, and 20% do 
not use the fee-in-lieu option. The option to pay a fee-in-lieu of building inclusionary 
units provides developers with flexibility in circumstances where building affordable 
units would be difficult. Municipalities apply the fee-in-lieu option in different ways, 
from allowing it “by-right” to allowing it only in extreme circumstances, to not allowing 
fee-in-lieu at all.  
From the study, 7 ordinances allow the fee-in-lieu by-right. Three ordinances 
allow fee-in-lieu, but restrict the usage geographically by allowing it only in strategic 
planning areas, or physically, by allowing it only for projects under a certain size. An 
additional 3 ordinances place other restrictions on usage of fee-in-lieu, such as 
disqualifying projects which displace existing low-income populations, or requiring that 
developers provide clear evidence that it would be cost-prohibitive to build the 
inclusionary units. Two grade-“A” ordinances (Basalt, Colorado and Calistoga, 
California) only allow fee-in-lieu payments for non-residential developments as part of 
the ordinance’s commercial linkage element.  
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Ordinances determine the fee-in-lieu payments in a variety of ways. In the most 
simplistic form, the fee-in-lieu is a flat fee per inclusionary unit that would have been 
required under the ordinance. This fee is usually set by the municipal governing body on 
an annual basis, and is usually a pre-determined fraction of the total cost of replacement 
for an average inclusionary unit. However, 3 ordinances (Davidson, North Carolina, 
Martin County, Florida, and Tallahassee, Florida) increase the required fee based on the 
selling price of the market-rate homes on which the inclusionary ordinance applies. Two 
municipalities (Montgomery County, Maryland, and Princeton, New Jersey) determine 
the price of the fee on a case-by-case basis. Eight municipalities allow land contribution 
as an acceptable form of payment, and one municipality (Blaine County, Idaho) returns 
the full fee payment to the developer if, after seven years, the municipality has failed to 
use the fee to build affordable housing. 
The 4 ordinances which do not permit fee-in-lieu are Burlington, Vermont, 
Washington, DC, New York City, and Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. The Washington, 
DC ordinance does not allow the fee-in-lieu option based on a policy decision that the 
main value the inclusionary ordinance provides is getting affordable units in 
neighborhoods where they otherwise would not be (Rodgers, 3/09/07). New York City 
and Mount Pleasant are both cities which do not mandate inclusionary housing and do not 
provide the fee-in-lieu tool. 
Fast-Track Processing 
One-quarter of the ordinances studied provide expedited processing for 
inclusionary projects. The 5 ordinances that provide fast-track processing are 
Montgomery County, Maryland, Princeton, New Jersey, Madison, Wisconsin, Denver, 
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Colorado, and Tallahassee, Florida. Fast-track processing is a tool that offsets the costs 
that developers incur due to delay and length of permitting periods. In practice, delay 
lengthens the development period and increases the cost to the developer (Luger and 
Temkin, 2000).  
There is some variation in how ordinances apply the fast-track processing tool. 
Denver sets a not-to-exceed 180-day time limit, while Princeton sets a 65-day time limit. 
In the Tallahassee ordinance, "expedited applications are to be reviewed prior to other 
applications flied on the same date or in the same application period, except for other 
applications including inclusionary housing or affordable housing."  
Three-quarters of ordinances exmined do not use fast-track processing as a cost-
offset. One explanation might be that the regulatory permit period in these communities 
is not overly burdensome. However, the fast-track processing tool was left out of the 
Washington, DC ordinance exactly because the permitting process in the city is 
notoriously slow. In the case of Washington, DC, there was no way to ensure that the 
fast-track tool would work. In addition, Washington, DC, which does not have a lengthy 
site plan review process, has a regional competitive advantage over surrounding suburban 
jurisdictions that do have site plan review processes (Rodgers, 3/09/07).  
Reductions/Exemptions for meeting affordable housing goals 
Over half of the ordinances studied provide a reduction or exemption in 
inclusionary requirements if a development meets one or more of the municipalities other 
affordable housing goals beyond building affordable units. For example, Washington, 
DC, Princeton, New Jersey, Burlington, Vermont, and Carlsbad and Pasadena in 
California reduce the requirements of developers who target lower income-households 
Development Incentives and Cost-offsets in Inclusionary Housing Programs     Emily J. Price 
Chapter 4: Summary of Cost-offsets 
Page 40 
for inclusionary units. Some ordinances reduce requirements for developments that 
support provision of other social services. For example, Calistoga, California provides an 
exemption for any development operated by a nonprofit organization that provides 
benefits or services such as homeless shelter, food distribution to lower-income 
households.  
Exemptions based on location or zoning district 
Approximately one-third of the ordinances in this study provide explicit 
exemptions for developments located within certain geographic areas, such as 
environmentally sensitive strategic planning areas or low-density residential zones.   
Development Flexibility 
There are five types of cost-offsets that provide additional flexibility for housing 
developers. These include off-site units, flexibility in housing type, and flexibility in 
zoning. These kinds of cost-offsets are intended to make it easier for developers to fulfill 
their inclusionary requirements. All ordinances in this study, except for Calistoga, 
California, provide at least one of these flexibility options to developers.  
Off-site units: 
Of the 20 ordinances in this study, 80% provide the option for off-site units. 
While some ordinances allow off-site inclusionary units "by right," 6 ordinances place 
restrictions on where and when the off-site units may be built. For example, Burlington, 
Vermont only allows the off-site option outside of the desirable waterfront zoning 
district, and then only at the discretion of the development review board which requires 
1.25 off-site units for every 1 inclusionary unit that would have been built on-site.   
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Twenty percent of ordinances do not allow off-site construction at all. The desire 
of some municipalities to restrict the use of off-site units follows the same line of 
reasoning as in the use of the fee-in-lieu tool. Allowing construction of inclusionary units 
off-site reduces the effect an inclusionary ordinance has on creating mixed-income 
neighborhoods.  
Choice of housing type: 
Of the 20 ordinances, 40% explicitly allow developers flexibility in the type of 
housing that is constructed to comply with the inclusionary requirement. Some 
specifically allow attached dwellings, town homes or apartments in districts that would 
not otherwise allow such structures. It may be assumed that additional flexibility 
implicitly exists depending on the zoning district in which the development is located. 
Mixed-use zoning: 
Of the 20 ordinances, 15% specifically allow developers to mix commercial and 
industrial uses into developments, in order to offset the cost of providing affordable units. 
These include Burlington, Vermont, Pasadena, California and Carlsbad, California. The 
Burlington ordinance allows developers to apply the density bonus to non-residential uses 
"wherever such nonresidential uses are otherwise permitted in the district where the 
project is located." Burlington uses the rate of 1500 square feet residential for every 1 
market-rate dwelling unit allowed through the density bonus.  
Wavier or other cost-offsets provided on case-by-case basis10: 
Half of the communities studied provide "other" waivers on a case-by-case basis, 
usually when petitioned for relief by the developer. This is a catch-all tool to allow for 
                                                 
10
 Four ordinances explicitly stated an exemption for alterations or rehabilitation to pre-existing 
nonconforming structures that do not increase the number of residential units. Several other ordinances 
implied the non-applicability of these projects.  
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any unforeseen circumstances. These waivers are typically provided to developers during 
the permitting process.   
Reductions of Standards 
 Through subdivision regulations, design guidelines, and the zoning code, 
municipalities provide guidelines and requirements for how developers may build a site. 
These dimensional requirements are determined at the local level based on local 
preferences for specific amenities or types of development in a jurisdiction. These kinds 
of dimensional requirements put restrictions on development, which in some cases can 
increase the cost of building. Some inclusionary ordinances relax these standards to allow 
developers the option to build without such restriction, thus providing a cost-offset for 
developers building inclusionary units.  
Transportation/Parking exemption: 
Just under one-third of ordinances examined contain provisions to allow 
developers to waive the parking or transportation requirements with which they would 
otherwise have to comply. The ordinances that provide this cost-offset are: Carlsbad, 
California; Pasadena, California; Princeton, New Jersey; Denver, Colorado; Madison, 
Wisconsin; and Tallahassee, Florida.  
It is intuitive to note that only localities where parking costs are a burden will 
consider providing this cost-offset. None of the cities listed above are in rural resort 
areas, which are less likely to have strict parking regulations. The municipalities in this 
study that provide a parking exemption are all urban areas where parking requirements 
pose an extra cost on developers.  
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There are limits to the benefits this cost-offset may provides. According to Teresa 
Ojeda, a planner in San Francisco, developers contend that waiving parking requirements 
makes developments less attractive and lowers the sale price on market rate units. In that 
sense, waiver of parking requirements is not necessarily a net gain for a developer 
(Ojeda, 3/14/07). The effectiveness of cost-offsets that exempt developers from 
regulation that actually adds value to a development is limited. 
Alleviation of Screening & Lot size requirements: 
 Over one-third of the ordinances provide developers with relief of screening and 
other site-specific requirements. The type of cost-offset provided varies with the 
municipality. For example, Tallahassee, Florida specifies that developers of inclusionary 
units qualify for "alleviation of setback and lot size requirements internal to the 
development." The ordinance for Princeton, New Jersey allows for specific lower-cost 
substitutes for standards that would otherwise be required: "Swales may be substituted 
for piped storm water systems, except in situations where swales are likely to cause 
erosion or impede pedestrian circulations." Princeton also allows developers to reduce 
standards for lighting, landscaping, and sidewalks, while ensuring that overall public 
safety standards are met.  
Interior finish of inclusionary units: 
 Of the 20 ordinances, 45% specifically allow that developers may construct 
inclusionary units with interior finishes that differ from market rate units. Some 
ordinances provide relatively detailed statements on how developers may use this cost-
offset. For example the Burlington, Vermont ordinances states:  
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Inclusionary Units may differ from the market units in a covered project with regard to interior 
amenities and gross floor area provided that:  (1) These differences, excluding difference related to 
size differentials, are not apparent in the general exterior appearance of the projects units; and (2) 
these differences do not include insulation, windows, heating systems, and other improvements 
related to the energy efficiency of the projects units; and (3) the gross floor area of the 
inclusionary units is not less than the following minimum requirements unless waived by the 
housing trust fund or its designee.11 
 While the interior of inclusionary units may differ from market rate units, many 
ordinances are clear that the exterior must remain the same. The Princeton, New Jersey 
ordinance specifies that the siting of units must allow inclusionary units to not be in "less 
desirable locations" and must have equal access to services such as transit and amenities 
such as common open space. 
  
                                                 
11
 The minimum gross floor area in Burlington is 750 sq ft for a one-bedroom unit, 1000 f sq ft or a two-
bedroom unit, 1100 sq ft for a three-bedroom unit, and 1250 sq ft for a four bedroom unit.  
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5. ANALYSIS OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS AND COST-OFFSETS 
The previous chapter provides an in-depth summary of the types of tools that 
municipalities provide developers in order to offset the cost of complying with 
inclusionary zoning ordinances. This chapter reports on the relationship between the use 
of specific cost-offsets and a range of contextual factors, such as population density and 
vacancy rates. The intention of this chapter is to present the analysis of the relationship 
between community context and use of cost-offsets.  
The variables that I examined in this analysis are listed in Table 1.12 Following is 
a summary of the results of the cross-tabulations. By ranking the municipalities by 
variable, I looked for patterns between use of cost-offset tool and the relative value of the 
variable. Appendix E provides the raw data for each variable by city. 
Table 4 Variables and Data Source 
Variable Explanation Source 
Population Size total population of Census Designated Place, County, or 
County Subdivision 
2000 US Census 
Population Density  persons per square mile 2000 US Census 
Geographical 
Region  
California, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, Rocky Mountain, 
Northeast, and South 
Author’s definition 
Type of Ordinance Mandatory, Voluntary, Conditional Ordinance 
Vacancy Rate  percent of housing units that are vacant 2000 US Census 
Poverty Rate  percent of families with incomes below the poverty level 2000 US Census 
Race  percent of population that is non-white; percent of population 
that is white 
2000 US Census 
Housing Tenure  percent of the population in owner-occupied housing; percent 
of the population in renter-occupied housing 
2000 US Census 
Senior Population  percent of the population 65 years old and greater 2000 US Census 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The data were taken from readily available custom tables from the 2000 US Census. Other variables that 
are less readily available may provide more insight into the use of incentives. These might include variables 
such as the number of units produced under inclusionary ordinances, or the political climate within each 
community at the time the ordinance was drafted.  
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Population Size 
The population among the 20 ordinances in this study ranges from over 8 million, 
in New York City, to just over 2500 people in Basalt, Colorado. The following table 
breaks down the population into three categories and lists the incentives that tend to 
correlate to population size. Cities with populations greater than 500,000 are classified as 
large; there are 6 cities in this category. Cities with populations between 35,000 and 
500,000 are classified as medium; there are 8 cities in this category. Cities with 
populations of less than 35,000 are classified as small; there are 6 cities in this category. 
Table 5 Population Size 
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Large  6 
cities 
5 38% 3 30% 1 9% 0 0% 1 17% 0 0% 
Medium 8 
cities 
6 46% 7 70% 6 55% 4 50% 4 67% 5 71% 
Small 6 
cities 
2 15% 0 0% 4 36% 4 50% 1 17% 2 29% 
Total 20 13 100% 10 100% 11 100% 8 100% 6 100% 7 100% 
 
Table 2 demonstrates several patterns in terms of usage of cost-offset and 
population size. In cities with larger populations, the density bonus is more frequently 
used. Eighty-five percent of the time the density bonus is used in places with large and 
medium populations, and only 15% of the time in places with small populations. Places 
with large populations tend to not provide exemptions from inclusionary requirements for 
meeting other affordable housing goals. 
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Places with medium population size tend to provide open ended waivers or cost-
offsets on a case-by-case basis, provide exemptions from meeting affordable housing 
goals, provide exemption from parking requirements, and provide exemptions from 
setback or minimum lot size requirements. Exactly half of the places that provided choice 
of housing type as a cost offset were medium-sized places, and the other half were small 
places. Places with small populations tend to offer flexibility in terms of choice of 
housing type for developments, and also provide exemptions from inclusionary 
requirements for developments that meet other affordable housing goals.  
Population Density 
The population density among the 20 ordinances ranges from over 26,000 persons 
per square mile in New York City, to only 7 persons per square mile in Blaine County, 
Idaho. The following table breaks down the population density into categories and lists 
the incentives that tend to correlate to population density. Cities with population density 
greater than 10,000 are classified as high; there are 3 cities in this category. Cities with 
population density between 10,000 and 2,000 are classified as medium; there are 8 cities 
in this category. Cities with population density of less than 2,000 are classified as low; 
there are 9 cities in this category. 
Table 6 Population Density 
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High 3 cities 2 15% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Medium 8 cities 7 54% 2 40% 2 25% 4 67% 3 43% 
Low 9 cities 4 31% 3 60% 6 75% 2 33% 4 57% 
Total 20 cities 13 100% 5 100% 8 100% 6 100% 7 100% 
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 Places with medium to high population density tend to use the density bonus. 
While the density bonus was only used 15% of the time in high population-density cities, 
two out of three of these high-density cities provided the density bonus. High density 
cities in this study do not provide any of the following cost-offsets: fast-track processing, 
choice of housing type, exemptions from parking requirements, or exemptions from 
setback, minimum lot size, or screening requirements.  
 Places with medium population density tend to provide exemptions from parking 
requirements. These communities also provide fast-track processing and exemptions from 
setback, minimum lot size, or screening requirements.  
 Places with low population density provide developers with additional 
development flexibility in terms of choice of housing type, and also provide fast-track 
processing and exemption from setback, minimum lot size, or screening requirements. 
Housing Tenure 
The rate of homeownership among the 20 ordinances ranges from just under 35% 
in New York City, to over 80% in Highland Park, Illinois and Davidson, North Carolina. 
The following table breaks down the homeownership rate into categories and lists the 
incentives that tend to correlate to high and low rates of homeownership. Cities where 
renters outnumber homeowners (homeownership rates of less than 50%) are classified as 
low; there are 7 cities in this category. Cities with homeownership rates between 50% 
and 66.2%, the US national average, are classified as medium; there are 4 cities in this 
category. Cities with homeownership rates higher than the national average of 66.2% are 
classified as high; there are 13 cities in this category. 
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Table 7 Housing Tenure 
Homeownership Rate 
 
D
en
sit
y 
B
o
n
u
s 
Fe
e 
in
 
Li
eu
 
O
ff-
sit
e 
u
n
its
 
Ch
o
ic
e 
o
f ho
u
sin
g 
ty
pe
 
Low 7 cities 6 46% 4 25% 2 20% 1 13% 
Medium 4 cities 2 15% 4 25% 2 20% 1 13% 
High 9 cities 5 38% 8 50% 6 60% 6 75% 
Total 20 cities 13 100% 16 100% 10 100% 8 100% 
 
 Places with low homeownership rates tend to provide the density bonus, which is 
used 46% of the time in cities with low homeownership rates. In addition, 6 out of 7 of 
these predominately renter cities use the density bonus. Places with low homeownership 
rates do not tend to use fee in lieu, or provide offsite units or choice of housing type as a 
cost offset.  
 All four cities classified with medium homeownership rates use the fee-in-lieu 
tool. Cities with high homeownership rates tend to also provide fee-in-lieu, allow offsite 
units, and provide choice of housing type for developers seeking additional flexibility for 
inclusionary developments.  
Vacancy Rate 
The vacancy rate among the 20 ordinances ranges from about 3% in places such 
as Montgomery County, Maryland, to over 30% in the resort community of Blaine 
County, Idaho. The following table breaks down the vacancy rate into categories and lists 
the incentives that tend to correlate to vacancy rates. Cities with vacancy rates less than 
5% are classified as low; there are 10 cities in this category. Cities with vacancy rates 
between 5% and 13% are classified as high; there are 7 cities in this category. Three of 
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the cities in the sample are noted as resort communities with extremely high vacancy 
rates, between 14% and 36%. 
Table 8 Vacancy Rate 
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Low 10 cities 4 80% 4 36% 1 14% 5 50% 
High 7 cities 1 20% 5 45% 4 57% 2 20% 
Resort 
Community 
3 cities 0 0% 2 18% 2 29% 3 30% 
Total 20 cities 5 100% 11 100% 7 100% 10 100% 
 
 Cities with low vacancy rates tend to provide fast track processing. Cities with 
low vacancy rates also provide the ability for developers to build off-site units. Resort 
communities with skewed high vacancy rates do tend to provide offsite units along with 
cities with low vacancy rates.  
 Cities with high vacancy rates do not provide fast-track processing, nor do they 
generally provide developers with the opportunity to build off-site units. However, cities 
with high vacancy rates do provide exemptions from inclusionary requirements for 
meeting other affordable housing goals. These communities also provide exemptions 
based on geographic district.  
Race 
The proportion of the population that is white varies from 31% in Washington, 
DC to over 90% in communities with very low non-white populations such as Burlington, 
Vermont. The following table breaks down the proportion of the total population that is 
white into categories and lists the incentives that tend to correlate to race. Cities where 
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the non-white population outnumbers the white population (where the percentage white 
population is less than 50%) are classified as low; there are 2 cities in this category. 
Cities where the white population is between 50% and 75.1%13 of the total population are 
classified as medium; there are 6 cities in this category. Cities with a white population 
that is greater than the national average of 75.1% are classified as high; there are 12 cities 
in this category. 
Table 9 Race 
Percent White 
Population 
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Low 2 cities 0 0% 2 13% 1 17% 0 0% 
Medium 6 cities 6 38% 5 31% 2 33% 1 13% 
High 12 cities 10 63% 9 56% 3 50% 7 88% 
Total 20 cities 16 100% 16 100% 6 100% 8 100% 
 
 Places with a higher than average percentages of white population tend to provide 
the fee-in-lieu option. These communities also provide offsite options for inclusionary 
units. Finally, places with higher than average white populations tend to provide 
developers with choice of housing type for additional flexibility.  
 Places with a low percentage of white population, and relatively higher minority 
population, do not tend to provide the fee-in-lieu option for developers. While these cities 
do tend to allow off-site units, they may only do so under extreme circumstances.  
                                                 
13
 75.1% is the US national average proportion of the population that is of white race (2000 US Census) 
14
 From the definition in Brown-Graham, 2004: "Extreme cases typically are environmental constraint on a 
parcel of land that prevent the inclusion of affordable units or use of density bonus." 
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Poverty Level 
The proportion of the population with incomes below poverty level ranges from 
2% in the wealthy Highland Park area outside Chicago, to 18% in New York City. The 
following table breaks down the percentage of the population with incomes at or below 
the poverty level into categories and lists the incentives that tend to correlate to poverty 
status. Cities with poverty level that is higher than the national average of 9.2% (2000 US 
Census) are classified as high; there are 7 cities in this category. Cities where the percent 
of families with incomes below poverty level is between 9.2% and 5% are classified as 
medium; there are 7 cities in this category. Cities where the number of families with 
incomes below the poverty level is less than 5% are classified as low; there are 6 cities in 
this category. 
Table 10 Poverty Level 
Percent Families Income 
Below Poverty Level 
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High 7 cities 4 25% 6 38% 3 50% 
Medium 7 cities 7 44% 6 38% 2 33% 
Low 6 cities 5 31% 4 25% 1 17% 
Total 20 cities 16 100% 16 100% 6 100% 
 
 Places with relatively high proportion of the population with incomes at or below 
poverty level generally tend to place restrictions on the provision of off-site units, only 
allowing them under extreme circumstances. These communities tend to not allow fee-in-
lieu.  
                                                 
15
 From the definition in Brown-Graham, 2004: "Extreme cases typically are environmental constraint on a 
parcel of land that prevent the inclusion of affordable units or use of density bonus." 
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 Wealthier communities with medium to low proportion of the population with 
incomes below poverty level generally do provide the fee-in-lieu option. Five out of the 
six wealthiest communities provide fee-in-lieu, and 75% of the time fee-in-lieu is used in 
communities with medium to low levels of poverty.  
Elderly Population 
The proportion of the population that is age 65 and older ranges from just 2% in 
Basalt, Colorado, to 28% in Martin County, Florida. The following table breaks down the 
percentage of the elderly population into categories and lists the incentives that tend to 
correlate to places with higher rates of elderly populations. Places with a greater than 
average elderly population that is higher than the national average of 12.4% (2000 US 
Census) are classified as high; there are 6 cities in this category. Cities where the percent 
of elderly population is less than the national average of 12.4% are classified as low; 
there are 14 cities in this category. 
Table 11 Elderly Population 
Percent Pop 65 years and over 
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High 6 cities 3 23% 6 38% 
Low 14 cities 10 77% 10 63% 
Total 20 cities 13 100% 16 100% 
 
 In places with a high proportion of elderly population, the density bonus is less 
frequently used. The fee-in-lieu is slightly more frequently used in these retirement 
communities; in fact all six cities with high levels of elderly population use the fee-in-
lieu.  
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 In places with low levels of elderly population, the density bonus is more 
frequently used. The fee-in-lieu is relatively less frequently used in places with low 
elderly population.  
Ordinance Type 
Most of the 20 ordinances sampled are mandatory inclusionary ordinances. Only 
3 of the 20 ordinances are not mandatory. The following table illustrates how the 
provision of cost-offsets in mandatory ordinances differs from the provision of cost-
offsets in ordinances that are not mandatory.  
Table 12 Ordinance Type 
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Yes 17 
cities 
5 100% 11 100% 8 100% 3 100% 6 100% 7 100% 9 100% 
No 3 
cities 
0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 20 
cities 
5 100% 11 100% 8 100% 3 100% 6 100% 7 100% 9 100% 
 
 Table 12 shows that non-mandatory ordinances do not offer the range and 
flexibility of cost-offsets that mandatory ordinances offer. Compared with mandatory 
ordinances, non-mandatory ordinances offer relatively few kinds of cost-offsets. 
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Geographic Region 
The 20 ordinances in this study represent a range of geographic regions listed in 
Table 13 below. The table illustrates the geographic pattern of the incidence of two 
specific cost-offsets differ among different regions of the country, fast track processing 
and choice of housing type.  
Table 13 Geographic Region 
Region 
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California 4 cities 0 0% 0 0% 
Mid-Atlantic 4 cities 2 40% 1 13% 
Mid-West 2 cities 1 20% 2 25% 
Mountain 3 cities 1 20% 1 13% 
Northeast 3 cities 0 0% 0 0% 
South 4 cities 1 20% 4 50% 
Total 20 cities 5 100% 8 100% 
 
 Neither the California nor the northeastern inclusionary ordinances offer fast-
track processing or choice of housing type. In contrast, all of the southern ordinances 
offer choice in housing type, and half of the mid-Atlantic ordinances offer fast track 
processing.  
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6. KEY FINDINGS REGARDING COMMUNITY CONTEXT AND 
CHOICE OF COST-OFFSETS:  
This chapter presents key findings from the results presented in Chapter Five on 
the relationship between the use of specific cost-offsets and a range of contextual factors, 
such as population density and vacancy rates. Although not statistically significant, this 
analysis describes plausible relationships between a community’s choice of cost-offsets 
and that community’s demographic, socio-economic, and geographic characteristics.  
Density Bonus 
Places that use the density bonus tend to have a higher population size and 
density, a lower homeownership rate, and a lower concentration of elderly population. 
Population size and population density may be an explanatory factor for the use 
the density bonus. The analysis in Chapter 5 shows that five of the six largest cities in the 
study use the density bonus, while only two of the six smallest places in the study use the 
density bonus. In places with larger populations, such as New York and San Francisco, 
land is at a premium. In these places, the value of additional buildable units is much 
greater than in places where land is not scarce. Similarly, greater population density also 
corresponds to increased use of the density bonus. The municipalities with a high and 
medium population density more frequently use the density bonus, while the 
municipalities with a lower population density do not use the density bonus as frequently. 
In places with a relatively high population density, land is a scarce commodity. In these 
places, developers benefit more from density bonuses. In addition, there may be more 
tolerance in these communities for greater density. 
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The use of the density bonus roughly corresponds to places with a lower 
proportion of ownership rates and a higher proportion of renter rates. Restated, places 
with higher ownership rates tend not to use the density bonus tool. Places with higher 
rates of senior citizens also tend not to use the density bonus tool. The three places with 
the highest rates of population age 65 and older do not use the density bonus (Martin 
County, Florida; Calistoga, California; and Quincy, Massachusetts).  
The literature has documented hesitancy in certain communities to use the density 
bonus as an incentive tool. Communities view the tradeoffs between greater affordable 
housing and greater density differently. In this analysis, places with high homeownership 
rates, low population density and/or high rates of senior citizens tend to exhibit this 
hesitancy towards greater density by not using the density bonus in the inclusionary 
ordinance. Notably, all of the places that do not use the density bonus do provide the fee-
in-lieu option, explained below. 
Fee-in-Lieu 
 Places that use the fee-in-lieu tool tend to be wealthier communities that have 
higher white populations, higher rates of homeownership, and a larger elderly population.  
The fee-in-lieu allows developers the option of paying money, usually to an 
affordable housing trust fund, instead of building affordable units. Places that do not 
allow fee-in-lieu of building inclusionary units place a priority on having developers 
build affordable housing, which is the original intention of inclusionary zoning. The cross 
tabulations in Chapter 5 highlight specific characteristic of places that do not allow the 
fee-in-lieu option. Places with high poverty rates, and places with a high proportion of 
non-white population, tend not to allow the fee-in-lieu option. In addition, places with 
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lower homeowner population/higher renter population also tend not to allow developers 
to pay fee-in-lieu. Places that allow fee-in-lieu are generally wealthier communities with 
a higher proportion of white population, a higher homeownership rate, and a larger 
elderly population allow the use of fee-in-lieu as a tool within inclusionary ordinances.  
Washington, DC does not allow developers to pay a fee-in-lieu of building 
inclusionary units. As explained in Chapter 4, the DC ordinance does not allow the fee-
in-lieu option based on a policy decision that the main value the inclusionary ordinance 
provides is getting affordable units in neighborhoods where they otherwise would not be 
built (Rodgers, 3/09/07). The data demonstrate that places with higher non-white 
populations, with higher poverty rates, and higher renter rates, place greater value on 
building developments which are inclusive of affordable and market rate units.  
Fast-Track Processing 
 The places that allow this tool tend to be Southern or Mid-Atlantic communities 
with relatively low vacancies and medium to low levels of population density. While only 
five places use this tool, some patterns emerged in the data that may explain the use of 
fast-track permit processing for inclusionary developments.  
 The regional variation among places that provide a fast-track process for 
inclusionary development indicates a geographical trend in the use of the fast-track tool. 
None of the ordinances from California or from the Northeast states provide fast-tracking 
for inclusionary developments. This may indicate a greater tolerance for entitlement 
processes than in other regions of the country, such as the Mid-Atlantic and the South, 
which provide fast-track processing.  
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Places with relatively low vacancy rates tend to allow fast track processing. One 
explanation may be the following. If communities that exhibit lower vacancy rates also 
tend to have longer entitlement processes, it would compound the problem of limited 
housing supply and low vacancy rate; the use of fast track processing in this case may be 
intended to relieve developers of the costs of developing under a relatively long 
entitlement process.  
The fast-track option is provided in places of low to mid-level population density, 
but is not provided in the five highest places ranked by population density. As discussed 
earlier, Washington, DC does not provide fast track processing because the 
implementation of fast-track permitting in that large city is not logistically feasible. The 
data may suggest that this is true in other places too, as other major cities of relatively 
high population density do not provide fast-track permitting to developers of inclusionary 
housing.  
Exemption for Meeting Other Affordable Housing Goals 
Places with relatively low vacancy rates and high population size do not provide 
exemptions for meeting other affordable housing goals.  
Inclusionary ordinances often provide exemptions or reductions of inclusionary 
requirements for developments that meet other affordable housing goals, such as deeper 
income targeting. The ordinances that do not provide such an exemption tend to be in 
places with low vacancy rates or large populations. One reason that these municipalities 
do not allow exemptions for services or income targeting may be that the housing market 
is relatively tight. It may be the case that these places put greater emphasis on the 
production of affordable units, rather than on other aspects of affordable housing. In these 
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markets the concern may be increasing unit supply rather than targeting lower incomes or 
providing housing with services. 
Offsite Units 
Places that allow offsite units tend to be places with lower vacancy rates, higher 
white population, and higher rates of homeownership.  
Most ordinances allow developers to build inclusionary units in a location other 
than the market-rate development. However, many communities put limitations on this 
option, and from the study, four communities do not allow off-site construction at all. 
The communities that do not allow off-site construction or only allow it in extreme 
circumstances are places that demonstrate high vacancy rates16, high poverty rates, lower 
white populations, and lower homeowner populations. Just as with the fee-in-lieu option, 
it is likely that these communities prioritize having developments which are inclusive of 
affordable and market rate units. 
Choice of Housing Type 
 Places that allow choice of housing type for developers seeking flexibility under 
inclusionary ordinances tend to have lower population densities, higher percentage of 
white population, and a higher rate of homeownership. Jurisdictions can provide 
developers with relief from requirements to build specific building types, such as single 
family residential units. This cost-offset allows developers to build inclusionary units as 
town homes, condominiums, or apartments, instead of as single-family residential units. 
                                                 
16Excluding resort communities (Basalt, CO, Martin County, PL, and Blaine County, ID) which have 
skewed vacancy rates due to seasonal population 
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This tool is used in communities that have a relatively low population density, have 
relatively greater proportion white population, and a relatively greater homeownership 
rates than other communities. From the study, the populations that provide this option are 
located primarily in the South and Midwest.  
Exemption from Parking Requirements / Site Requirements 
 The places with the highest level of population density do not provide either 
parking requirements or relief from set-back, minimum lot size, or screening 
requirements. In terms of wavier of parking requirements, a planner in San Francisco 
noted that developers do not see this as a benefit, because the existence of parking is 
considered too necessary of an amenity to leave out of a development. This is one 
explanation for why heavily dense cities with otherwise strict parking requirements do 
not provide developers with parking waivers as a cost-offset.  
Places with very high population densities generally are big cities that encourage 
dense development in urban centers. Setback, minimum lot size, and screening 
requirements are more common restrictions in suburban areas that do not emphasize 
dense development. This explains why more dense urban areas do not provide an 
exemption for setback or minimum lot sizes, which are generally not relevant in urban 
areas in the first place.  
Type of Ordinance 
While mandatory ordinances use legal means to enforce development of 
inclusionary units, conditional and voluntary ordinances rely on cost-offset tools to give 
developers an incentive that is great enough to get them to build affordable units.  
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Conversely than might be expected, mandatory ordinances offer a much wider 
breadth and depth of incentives and cost-offsets than voluntary or conditional ordinances. 
This is the opposite of what would be expected, considering that in non-mandatory 
ordinances the cost offsets are the key to getting developers to participate in the program. 
Not one of the three non-mandatory ordinances offered either fast track permitting, 
exemptions for meeting housing goals, choice of housing type, approval of mixed use 
zoning, exemptions for parking requirements, exemptions for site requirements, or 
allowance for inclusionary units to differ form market-rate units. This may be one of the 
reasons why mandatory ordinances are more effective than conditional or voluntary 
ordinances. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
  The cost-offsets and incentives that local governments provide developers 
through inclusionary zoning ordinances are wide-ranging. The cost-offsets take various 
forms, from the density bonus that allows developers to build more than would otherwise 
be allowed, to specific exemptions that allow developers relief from regulations that they 
would otherwise have to follow. Cost-offsets provide developers with additional 
flexibility in order to indirectly offset the costs incurred by building inclusionary units for 
sale at below-market prices. 
Places provide cost-offsets that make financial and political sense in the 
community. For example, exemptions from parking requirements tend to not be offered 
in places with very high population density. In these communities, providing parking is 
an important amenity; by not providing parking, developers reduce the attractiveness of 
developments. Therefore, an exemption from the parking requirement is not valuable to 
developers in these contexts. In another example, the density bonus is most frequently 
used in places with medium to high population density. In these types of communities 
where buildable land is scarce, the density bonus is more valuable. Communities where 
population density is already relatively high are also likely more tolerant of increased 
density.  
This study demonstrates that there are a variety of cost-offsets available for 
municipalities to choose from when deciding on the particular selection that is most 
suitable to that community’s context. Municipalities must choose a menu of cost-offsets 
that suits the physical, economic and demographic characteristics of the community. 
Municipalities must also be sensitive to the political realities of development in their 
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community. Finally, municipalities should provide the cost-offsets that have the greatest 
value to developers in the local community.  
This study explores the variety and usage of cost-offsets in inclusionary 
ordinances across the country. Future research on this subject might explore the degree of 
effectiveness among different cost-offsets. Future research could attempt to measure the 
impact of different cost-offsets on the actual production of inclusionary units, on the 
developer's bottom line, and on the community at large.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A 
List of all known inclusionary ordinances. 
REGION STATE MUNICIPALITY 
Mountain CO Basalt   
Mountain CO Denver  
Mountain CO Longmont  
Mountain CO Boulder 
Mountain CO Carbondale  
Mountain CO Eagle County  
Mountain CO Fort Collins 
Mountain CO Glenwood Springs 
Mountain CO Pitkin County & Aspen 
Mountain CO San Miguel County 
Mountain CO Steamboat Springs 
Mountain CO Telluride 
Mountain CO Louisville 
North-east CT Stamford 
North-east CT Norwalk 
Mid-Atlantic DC District of Colombia 
South FL Palm Beach County 
South FL Tallahassee  
South FL Martin 
South FL Sarasota County 
South FL St John's County 
South FL Tampa 
South GA Atlanta, Cobb County 
South GA Fulton County 
Mountain ID Blaine County 
Mountain ID McCall 
Mid-West IL Highland Park 
Mid-West IL Chicago 
North-east MA Boston  
North-east MA Quincy 
North-east MA Somerville  
North-east MA Arlington  
North-east MA Barnstable  
North-east MA Brookline  
North-east MA Cambridge  
North-east MA Lexington  
North-east MA Newton 
North-east MA Walpole 
North-east MA Watertown 
Mid-Atlantic MD Montgomery County 
Mid-Atlantic MD Annapolis 
Mid-Atlantic MD Frederick  
Mid-Atlantic MD Rockville  
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Mid-West MN Twin Cities 
South NC Davidson 
South NC Manteo 
Mid-Atlantic NJ Princeton Borough and Township 
Mid-Atlantic NJ Montclair 
South-west NM Santa Fe  
Mountain NV Tahoe Region 
Mid-Atlantic NY New York 
North-west OR Sisters 
North-west OR Ashland 
North-west OR Portland  
North-east RI South Kingstown 
North-east RI Barrington 
North-east RI  East Providence 
South SC Charleston & Mount Pleasant 
Mid-Atlantic VA Fairfax County  
Mid-Atlantic VA Loudoun County  
Mid-Atlantic VA South Hampton Roads 
North-east VT Burlington  
North-west WA King County 
Mid-West WI Madison 
California CA Agoura Hills  
California CA Alameda County   
California CA Arroyo Grande  
California CA Benicia  
California CA Berkeley  
California CA Brea  
California CA Brentwood  
California CA Calistoga  
California CA Carlsbad  
California CA Chula Vista  
California CA Clayton  
California CA Contra Costa County    
California CA Coronado  
California CA Corte Madera  
California CA Cotati  
California CA Cupertino  
California CA Daly City  
California CA Danville  
California CA Davis  
California CA Del Mar  
California CA Dublin  
California CA East Palo Alto  
California CA Emeryville  
California CA Encinitas  
California CA Fairfax  
California CA Fremont  
California CA Gonzales  
California CA Half Moon Bay  
California CA Healdsburg  
California CA Hercules  
California CA Hesperia  
California CA Huntington Beach  
Development Incentives and Cost-offsets in Inclusionary Housing Programs     Emily J. Price 
Appendix 
  Page 70  
California CA Irvine  
California CA Isleton  
California CA Laguna Beach  
California CA Larkspur  
California CA Livermore  
California CA Lompoc  
California CA Long Beach  
California CA Los Altos  
California CA Mammoth Lakes  
California CA Marin County    
California CA Menlo Park  
California CA Mill Valley  
California CA Monrovia  
California CA Monterey  
California CA Monterey County    
California CA Morro Bay  
California CA Napa  
California CA Napa County    
California CA Nevada County    
California CA Novato  
California CA Oceanside  
California CA Oxnard  
California CA Pasadena  
California CA Patterson  
California CA Petaluma  
California CA Pismo Beach  
California CA Pleasant Hill  
California CA Pleasanton  
California CA Port Hueneme  
California CA Portola Valley  
California CA Poway*  
California CA Rancho Palos Verdes  
California CA Richmond  
California CA Rio Vista  
California CA Ripon  
California CA Rohnert Park  
California CA Roseville  
California CA Sacramento (New Growth Areas)  
California CA Salinas  
California CA San Anselmo  
California CA San Benito County    
California CA San Carlos  
California CA San Clemente  
California CA San Diego (Future Urbanizing Areas)  
California CA San Francisco  
California CA San Juan Bautista  
California CA San Juan Capistrano  
California CA San Leandro  
California CA San Luis Obispo  
California CA San Marcos  
California CA San Mateo  
California CA San Mateo County    
California CA San Rafael  
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California CA Santa Barbara County    
California CA Santa Monica  
California CA Santa Rosa  
California CA Sebastapol  
California CA Solana Beach  
California CA Sonoma  
California CA South San Francisco  
California CA Sutter County    
California CA Tiburon  
California CA Union City  
California CA Vista 
California CA Watsonville  
California CA West Hollywood  
California CA Winters  
California CA Woodland  
California CA Yolo County    
California CA Yountville  
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Appendix B 
Citation of Ordinances retrieved between January 16 and 30, 2007. 
 
MUNICIPALITY STATE SOURCE  
Basalt, CO CO CHAPTER 16 Zoning retrieved from  http://www.colocode.com/basalt.html 
Blaine County, 
ID 
ID SUBDIVISION INCLUSIONARY ORDINANCE BLAINE COUNTY, IDAHO 10-
5-4 retrieved from   http://www.co.blaine.id.us/BCCInclusionaryFinalEdition.pdf 
Boston, MA MA http://www.cityofboston.gov/dnd/housingboston2012/mayormenino.asp  
Burlington, VT VT Article 14: Inclusionary Zoning/Density Bonus 
http://www.ci.burlington.vt.us/planning/zoning/znordinance/article14.html 
Calistoga, CA CA Chapter 17.08 AFFORDABLE HOUSING  retrieved from 
http://web.ci.calistoga.ca.us/planning/Planning.htm 
Carlsbad , CA CA Title 21 ZONING Chapter 21.85 INCLUSIONARY HOUSING 
http://ci.carlsbad.ca.us/chall/ccodes.html 
Davidson, NC NC 18.0 Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance retrieved from 
http://www.ci.davidson.nc.us/units/planning/ordinance/default.asp 
Denver, CO CO ARTICLE IV. AFFORDABLE HOUSING retrieved from 
http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=10257&sid=6 
Highland Park, 
IL 
IL Article XXI Inclusionary Housing Ordinance 
http://www.cityhpil.com/government/chapter150.html 
Madison, WI WI CITY OF MADISON, WISCONSIN  July 13, 2006 Amended Ordinance retrieved 
from http://www.cityofmadison.com/cdbg/iz/ 
Martin County, 
FL 
FL IH_ord_12-08-05 AN ORDINANCE OF MARTIN COUNTY, FLORIDA, 
AMENDING ARTICLE 3, ZONING DISTRICTS, OF THE LAND 
DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS, MARTIN COUNTY CODE retrieved from 
www.martin.fl.us/ 
Montgomery 
County, MD 
MD Regulation No. 13-05AM retrieved from 
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/dhca/housing/housing_P/mpdu/pdf/e
xecreg13-05am.pdf 
Mount Pleasant, 
SC 
SC Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina Code of Ordinances TITLE XV: LAND USAGE  
CHAPTER 156: ZONING CODE  Retrieved from 
http://www.townofmountpleasant.com/index.cfm?section=8&page=13 
New York, NY NY Citywide R10 Inclusionary Housing Program retrieved from 
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/developers/incentive.shtml 
Pasadena, CA CA Article 4 — Site Planning and General Development Standards retrieved from 
http://www.ci.pasadena.ca.us/zoning/P-4.html#17.42 
Princeton 
Borough and 
Township, NJ 
NJ Princeton Borough and Township Article XII. Affordable Housing. DIVISION 
1.  GENERAL. Sec. 10B-332.  retrieved from 
http://70.168.205.112/princeton_nj/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=site_main-j.htm&2.0 
Quincy, MA MA Section 17.04.235 Inclusionary zoning--Applicability--Requirements--Affordable 
housing trust committee. Retrieved from  
 http://www.bpcnet.com/codes/quincy/ 
San Francisco, 
CA 
CA SEC. 315. HOUSING REQUIREMENTS FOR RESIDENTIAL AND LIVE/WORK 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS retrieved from 
http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=14139&sid=5 
Tallahassee, FL FL Inclusionary Housing Ordinance No. 04-O-90AA retrieved from 
http://www.talgov.com/planning/af_inch/af_inchouse3.cfm#Development 
Washington, DC DC NOTICE OF FINAL RULEMAKING And Z.C. ORDER NO. 04-33 Z.C. Case No. 
04-33 (Text Amendments – 11 DCMR) (Chapter 26 Inclusionary Zoning retrieved 
from http://dcoz.dc.gov/alternate/trans/trans_view.asp? 
view=%2Forders%2F04%2D33%2Epdf 
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Appendix C 
Matrix of Direct and Indirect Cost Offsets 
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Basalt, CO A X   X    X  
Blaine County, CO  A   X X  X X X X 
Burlington, VT  A   X   X  X X 
Calistoga, CA  A    X  X    
Carlsbad , CA  A X  X X  X  X X 
Davidson, NC  A    X  X X X X 
Highland Park, IL  A X  X X    X X 
Pasadena, CA  A   X X  X  X X 
Princeton Borough and 
Township, NJ 
A    X X X  X X 
Denver, CO  B  X X X X   X X 
Madison, WI  B X X X X X X  X X 
Martin County, FL B    X  X X X X 
Montgomery County, 
MD  
B X  X X X   X  
San Francisco, CA  B X  X X    X X 
Washington, DC  B   X   X X X X 
Boston, MA  C    X   X X  
Mount Pleasant, SC  C  X X    X X  
New York, NY  C   X     X  
Quincy, MA  C    X    X  
Tallahassee, FL  C X  X X X X X X X 
TOTAL  7 3 13 16 5 11 7 19 13 
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Appendix D 
Matrix of Indirect Cost-Offsets that allow Flexibility or Reduction of Standards 
 
  FLEXIBILITY REDUCTION OF 
STANDARDS 
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Basalt, CO A X X      
Blaine County, CO  A X     X X 
Burlington, VT  A Extreme17  X X   X 
Calistoga, CA  A        
Carlsbad , CA  A X  X X X X  
Davidson, NC  A  X     X 
Highland Park, IL  A X X     X 
Pasadena, CA  A X  X X X X  
Princeton Borough and 
Township, NJ 
A Extreme X   X X X 
Denver, CO  B X    X   
Madison, WI  B X X  X X X X 
Martin County, FL B X X  X  X  
Montgomery County, 
MD  
B X   X    
San Francisco, CA  B Extreme   X   X 
Washington, DC  B Extreme      X 
Boston, MA  C    X    
Mount Pleasant, SC  C  X  X    
New York, NY  C X       
Quincy, MA  C Extreme       
Tallahassee, FL  C Extreme X  X X X X 
Total   16 8 3 10 6 7 9 
 
                                                 
17
 From the definition in Brown-Graham, 2004: "Extreme cases typically are environmental constraint on a 
parcel of land that prevent the inclusion of affordable units or use of density bonus." 
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Appendix E 
Matrix of Variables (Source: 2000 US Census) 
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Basalt, CO CO Mountain M 2681 1395 68% 32% 14% 92% 7% 5% 33% 2% 
Blaine 
County, ID ID Mountain M 18991 7 71% 29% 36% 91% 8% 5% 24% 8% 
Boston, MA MA North-
east C 589141 12166 36% 64% 5% 54% 41% 15% 30% 10% 
Burlington, 
VT VT 
North-
east M 38889 3682 46% 54% 3% 92% 5% 10% 29% 11% 
Calistoga, 
CA CA California M 5190 1997 53% 47% 9% 77% 20% 5% 26% 19% 
Carlsbad , 
CA CA California M 78247 2090 69% 31% 7% 87% 10% 3% 26% 14% 
Davidson, 
NC NC South M 7139 1468 83% 17% 13% 89% 11% 3% 16% 11% 
Denver, CO CO Mountain M 554636 3617 56% 44% 5% 65% 31% 11% 25% 11% 
Highland 
Park, IL IL Mid-West M 31365 2538 83% 17% 3% 91% 8% 2% 21% 15% 
Madison, WI WI Mid-West M 208054 3030 53% 47% 4% 84% 14% 6% 26% 9% 
Martin 
County, FL FL South M 126731 228 80% 20% 16% 90% 9% 6% 21% 28% 
Montgomery 
County, MD MD 
Mid-
Atlantic M 873341 1762 72% 28% 3% 65% 32% 4% 19% 11% 
Mount 
Pleasant, SC SC South M 47609 1136 79% 21% 6% 90% 9% 3% 18% 10% 
New York, 
NY NY 
Mid-
Atlantic V 8008278 26403 34% 66% 6% 45% 50% 18% 33% 12% 
Pasadena, 
CA CA California M 133936 5799 48% 52% 4% 53% 41% 12% 30% 12% 
Princeton 
Borough & 
Township, 
NJ 
NJ Mid-Atlantic M 30230 1658 67% 33% 4% 80% 17% 4% 22% 12% 
Quincy, MA MA North-
east C 88025 5244 59% 41% 3% 80% 19% 5% 22% 16% 
San 
Francisco, 
CA 
CA California M 776733 16634 42% 58% 5% 50% 46% 8% 27% 14% 
Tallahassee, 
FL FL South M 150624 1574 48% 52% 8% 60% 38% 13% 33% 8% 
Washington, 
DC DC 
Mid-
Atlantic M 572059 9316 44% 56% 10% 31% 67% 17% 25% 12% 
 
 
